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Abstract. This paper will discuss the Logjam attack on TLS. The Log-
jam attack allows, under certain conditions, to defeat the security pro-
vided by TLS. This is done by manipulating server and client into using
weak and deprecated export grade crypto, and subsequently breaking
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We explore how the attack works con-
ceptually and how exactly TLS is vulnerable to this attack. Also, the
conditions under which the attack can be mounted are discussed, and an
estimate of the impact of the attack is presented. Lastly, several mitiga-
tions are presented.
1 Introduction
In recent days, awareness about the security of communications is on the rise.
More and more websites provide secure connections to protect visitors from Man-
in-the-Middle attacks that might compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of
the communication. Initiatives like Let’s Encrypt[8] further facilitate the transi-
tion towards encrypted communication.
TLS is a cryptographic protocol that facilitates setting up and using secure
communication channels, supporting several authentication methods and differ-
ent cryptographic suites. TLS is well known for its use in HTTPS, but also
IMAP, SMTP and many other protocols rely on TLS. As such, the security of
TLS is very important. In the past, various vulnerabilities in the TLS protocol
or in its implementations were found, such as the Lucky 13[2] and FREAK[10][5]
attacks.
In this paper, we discuss the Logjam attack, that targets the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol. In Section 2 we will discuss Diffie-Hellman, and briefly
cover how it can be attacked. The parts of the TLS protocol that are relevant
are discussed in Section 3, while the actual Logjam attack is explained in Section
4. Different countermeasures are presented in Section 5, and the main points of
this paper are summarized in the conclusion in Section 6.
The Logjam attack is applicable against TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2. In
this paper, when the term TLS is used, version 1.2 is meant except if stated
otherwise.
2 Breaking Diffie Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange[7] is a cryptographic algorithm that is used in
order to securely generate a shared secret between two communicating parties.
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2This key can then be used as a symmetric key in order to allow the parties to
communicate securely.
Alice Bob
g, p g, p
Generate a ∈ Zp
ga−−−−−−−−−−→
Generate b ∈ Zp
gb←−−−−−−−−−−
s← (gb)a s← (ga)b
After running the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, Alice and Bob have
obtained shared secret s = gab. An attacker that intercepts their communica-
tion will have the values of ga and gb, but will be unable to obtain the shared
secret gab. In order to obtain this, the attacker will have to compute a discrete
logarithm to either obtain the secret exponent a or b. The security of the Diffie-
Hellman protocol resides in the fact that solving the discrete log problem is
computationally hard.
Solving the Discrete Log problem for large groups p is efficiently done using
the number field sieve algorithm[13]. Other algorithms exist that can solve the
discrete log problem faster, such as the one presented by Barbulescu et al. [4],
but these algorithms have additional constraints1, rendering them unsuitable for
attacking real-world Diffie-Hellman key exchanges.
The Number Field Sieve algorithm consists of four steps. We will not discuss
the algorithm in detail, but will present a short overview of the steps, as this is
relevant for understanding the Logjam attack. More details about the number
field sieve algorithm can easily be found online, a great introduction is presented
in A Tale of Two Sieves[12] by Pomerance.
The first step is Polynomial selection, which takes a relatively short time and
is easily parallelized, but is important as it has great influence on the running
time of the second step[3], which is the sieving step. During the sieving, ranges of
field elements are factored in order to find elements that are B-smooth2. Sieving
also parallelizes well. The third step is linear algebra. A large matrix is built,
consisting of the coefficient vectors found in the previous step. This step can,
to some extent, also be parallelized. The fourth and final step is the descent. In
this step, the output of the previous step is used to compute the discrete log for
a given a, g.
1 The algorithm by Barbulescu et al. requires the finite field to be of small character-
istic
2 A number is B-smooth if it only consists of prime factors less than B. In other words,
it can be factored in relatively small primes.
33 TLS
Before we discuss how Logjam uses the number field sieve algorithm in order to
attack TLS, we first discuss in some detail how the relevant part of TLS works3.
When a client connects to a server through TLS, he sends a ClientHello
message. The format of the message is as follows, as specified4 in RFC 5246[6]:
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
select (extensions_present) {
case false: struct {};
case true: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
};
} ClientHello;
The server receives the ClientHello message, and picks a cipher from the
CipherSuite list that both client and server support5. For the Logjam attack, the
DHE ciphersuites are relevant. The server replies with a ServerHello message,
structured as follows:
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
CompressionMethod compression_method;
select (extensions_present) {
case false: struct {};
case true: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
};
} ServerHello;
The ServerHello is followed by a ServerCertificate message, containing
containing the server’s certificate and the certificate chain linking the certificate
to a trusted Certificate Authority. In the case of a DHE-family ciphersuite, the
server now sends a ServerKeyExchange message
3 Many ways of using TLS are possible, like using client certificates for authentication.
We do not discuss these features and limit ourselves to the TLS handshake protocol
in the most common scenario, where the only the server authenticates to the user
by means of a signed certificate.
4 For the sake of brevity, for some of the TLS messages mentioned in this section, the
full message structure definition is omitted or shortened.
5 Ideally, the server picks the most secure cipher suite that is mutually supported.
4struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case dh_anon:
ServerDHParams params;
case dhe_dss:
case dhe_rsa:
ServerDHParams params;
digitally-signed struct {
opaque client_random[32];
opaque server_random[32];
ServerDHParams params;
} signed_params;
} ServerKeyExchange;
Note that the ServerKeyExchange contains signed Diffie-Hellman parame-
ters, but does not contain the actual cipher suite that was chosen by the server.
This is relevant for the Logjam attack, as explained in the next section. The
server ends the Hello phase by sending a ServerHelloDone message. The client
has now received the server’s Diffie-Hellman parameters, namely the modulus
p, generator g and the server’s Diffie-Hellman public value Ys, and responds
to the server by sending a ClientKeyExchange message, containing the client’s
Diffie-Hellman public value Yc. The client now sends the Finished message, se-
curely encrypted with the negotiated cipher and key. The server responds by
also sending a Finished message, finalizing the handshake.
Clients may use the so-called False Start [9]. This allows the client send an
encrypted data packet before it received the Finished message from the server,
in order to reduce the latency caused by the TLS handshake protocol.
4 Logjam
Logjam[1] is an attack on TLS, that makes use of a protocol flaw in TLS in
conjunction with support for obsolete and insecure protocols. The attack works
as follows:
4.1 Target selection
In order to be vulnerable for the Logjam attack, there are some properties that
must hold for the server configuration. The server should either support an
export-grade cipher suite, or support DHE with a small prime. Export-grade
ciphers are ciphers that were intentionally weakened in the 1990s in order to
comply with US export laws on cryptographic technology.
The authors of the original research paper demonstrated that attacking 512-
bit primes is very possible with today’s technology, while the precomputation
for 768-bit primes should be feasible for academic research teams. According to
Adrian et al., it is possible that nation-state level opponents could break a small
5number of 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman groups, although the precomputation would
still take a very long time. They argue that this is possibly already the case,
based on evidence of the NSA’s VPN decryption infrastructure that were leaked
by Edward Snowden[14].
An important issue is that some primes are used by many different servers.
This allows an attacker to do the precomputation once, and use the log db in
order to attack many different servers. While computation for 512-bits primes
is not extremely expensive, this definitely increases the plausibility of attacks
against 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman groups, as this would only be sufficiently re-
warding if more than a single target server can be attacked using the log db.
According to Adrian et al., at the time they published their research paper, 8.4%
of the top million websites are vulnerable for the Logjam attack as they support
the use of 512-bit groups. An attacker who is able to compute a log db for the
single most used 1024-bit group is able to attack 37.1% of the one million most
popular websites.
4.2 Precomputation of log db
Once the prime p that is used by the targeted server(s) is known, the attacker
proceeds to perform a precomputation. This largely follows the steps outlined in
Section 2, but the precomputation only involves the first three steps. The reason
is that the first three stages of the algorithm are solely based on the prime p.
If we want to compute a from y = ga mod p, we only need to use the values
of y and g in the descent stage. Logjam exploits this by precomputing the first
three steps for a desired prime p, and storing the intermediate result in a log db.
When attempting to compute a discrete log in the field Zp, the log db is used
as input for the descent phase.
Computing a log db takes a long time. However, it is important to know that,
while the Logjam attack focuses on downgrading a TLS connection to export
grade crypto (as explained in the next step), a nation-state level attacker could
possibly attack servers that only support regular, 1024-bit DHE cipher suites.
4.3 Man-in-the-Middle of a connection
When the attacker has built a log db for a given prime, he can abuse a Man-in-
the-Middle scenario and intercept and decrypt the communication between the
client and the server. This works as illustrated in figure 1.
The ClientHello message is modified by the attacker, removing all crypto-
graphic suites and adding an export-grade suite that is supported by the server.
The server trivially accepts to use this suite, as it is the only suite they both
’support’. The ServerHello message that is sent to the client is now modified,
the DHE EXPORT cipher choice is replaced by regular DHE as not to arouse
suspicion and to not depend on DHE EXPORT support on the client side. When
the server sends his signed ServerKeyExchange message, this discrepancy be-
tween cipher suite choices between client and server is not a problem, as the
DHE parameters have the same format. The server also sent his Diffie-Hellman
6Fig. 1. Message Sequence Chart of the Logjam attack. Source: [1]
public value gb, and the attacker starts to solve the discrete log problem using
the log db, in order to uncover b. The client will send his public value, and send
the Finished message. As soon as the attacker found the value b, the attacker
sends the message and herewith completes the TLS handshake. He is now able
to decrypt any encrypted traffic between client and server, and can also modify
and re-encrypt data.
If the client uses False Start, he might send a first encrypted data packet
before receiving the server’s Finished message. In that case, the attacker may
decrypt the packet at any time when the discrete log has been found. Even with
the log db, finding b is computationally hard, but there are tricks to hide or
increase the time-frame required by the attacker in order to be able to send a
valid Finished message. The client’s browser will timeout if the server does not
send any new TLS message within a certain time-frame. However, the attacker
can send a TLS warning alert which, besides resetting the timeout, is ignored
by the client. The attacker could open a TLS session to a server the client is
expected to connect to by injecting an invisible element from the target server in
an unencrypted webpage that is also visited by the client, and solve the discrete
log with little time pressure. This connection can then be kept alive, in order to
avoid suspicion due to a long wait when the client visits the target server.
5 Countermeasures
Logjam relies on several server and client settings, and different possibilities
exist to limit or fully mitigate the risks of the Logjam attack. In this section,
7we discuss several safeguards that may be implemented by the server and/or by
the client.
5.1 Server-side countermeasures
– Randomization of the parameter p. Although generating a prime p that is
safe to use6 is computationally expensive, it should be possible to let the
server generate one upon installation. In that case, there is less reward for
an attacker to do the precomputation for any prime p, as it will allow him
to attack only a single server. Additionally, the prime could be regenerated
periodically, in order to further limit the potential gain for an attacker.
– Disable support for export-grade cipher suites. Export grade cipher suites
use small, 512-bits primes, and as such must be considered unsafe. The server
should not be using primes shorter than 2048 bits.
– Use ECDHE instead of DHE. ECDHE is a variant of Diffie-Hellman which
operates in an elliptic curve instead of a finite field. The advantage here is
that discrete log algorithms for elliptic curves do not benefit as much from
precomputation, raising the bar for an attacker.
5.2 Client-side countermeasures
– Require long primes p. Currently, 2048 bits primes are considered secure,
while 1024 bits primes may be compromised when considering nation-state
level opponents. Note that the client should actually check if p > 21024 as a
1024 bits prime can simply be padded with zeroes in order to be accepted
as a 2048 bits.
– Reduce TLS handshake timeout. This provides the attacker with a shorter
time window in which he must solve the DL, increasing the difficulty of the
attack. Also, the timeout should be separate from the current timer, in order
to ensure that it cannot be reset by the attacker using TLS warning alert
messages.
– Be careful with TLS False Start. Even when using shorter timeouts (as dis-
cussed before), the data that is transmitted before the handshake completes
can be decrypted by an attacker as soon as he solved the discrete log for this
session and obtains the shared secret.
6 Conclusion
It is expected that TLS 1.3 will mitigate the Logjam attack by adding a field to
the ServerKeyExchange message, that contains the cipher suite chosen by the
6 Not all primes are safe, there are some constraints on which primes are suitable for
use. Some servers actually use unsafe primes. David et al. [1] found 6.8% of servers
are configured with a p for which (p1)/2 is composite, potentially rendering them
vulnerable to attack if it consists solely of relatively small prime factors[11].
8server. This field should, like the Diffie-Hellman parameters, be protected against
tampering by a signature. This solves the vulnerability, as an attacker can no
longer trick the client into believing a strong cipher suite was chosen, while the
server chose a deprecated and insecure cipher suite. TLS 1.2, however, can be
expected to remain supported for a long time, and until support is phased out
the Logjam attack remains a serious threat. Precautions must be taken in order
to limit the risks of abuse, and different countermeasures exist. In the opinion
of the author, a solution that is in most cases relatively easy to implement
would be to either adopt strong, 2048-bit primes, or to diversify 1024-bit primes
by (preferably periodically) generating them on the server. This would either
make precomputation infeasible or at least drastically decrease the advantage
of precomputation, as the resulting log db could only be used against a single
server. Other solutions, like transitioning away from DHE towards ECDHE, are
possibly more secure, but require larger changes to existing infrastructure, as
not all software supports the stronger ECDHE cipher suite families.
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